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SUMMARY 
In the scientific article topical issues of prosecutor and preliminary investigation bodies cooperation under the new Criminal 
procedural code of Ukraine on the basis of research of statistical data are considered. Nature of such cooperation is studied, as well 
as its main forms and ways. Problems in this sphere come to light, ways of their solving are offered. The conclusion about the need 
of further expansion of powers of the prosecutor for pre-judicial investigation is given reason. 
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АННОТАЦИЯ 
В статье на основании исследования статистических данных рассмотрены актуальные вопросы взаимодействия про-
курора и органов досудебного расследования по новому Уголовному процессуальному кодексу Украины. Исследуются 
характер такого взаимодействия и его основные формы и способы. Выявляются проблемы в данной сфере, предлагаются 
пути их устранения. Аргументируется вывод о необходимости дальнейшего расширения полномочий прокурора в до-
судебном расследовании. 
Ключевые слова: прокурор, органы досудебного расследования, следователь, указание прокурора, процессуальное 
руководство, уголовное производство. 
Introduction. Due to the current Criminal procedural code of Ukraine the mechanism of pre-judicial 
investigation was reformed. In this mechanism the key role 
belongs to preliminary investigation bodies and the prosecutor. 
Thereof, the problem of cooperation between these subjects 
needs studying. This research will be useful for scientists and 
practicing lawyers of not only Ukraine, but also other states. 
These matters directly or indirectly were a subject 
of scientific research of many scientists, in particular 
O. Ya. Bayev, P.M. Karkach, O.A. Kozhevnikov, M.V. Kosyuta, 
V.F. Kryukov, V.A. Lazareva, N.V. Marchuk, A.A. Tushev, 
V.M. Yurchishin, etc. However, not all aspects of this issue 
found sufficient lighting in their works. Therefore, there is a 
need of further scientific research of the problem mentioned 
above. 
The purpose of the scientific article is solving of the 
most problematic questions of prosecutors and preliminary 
investigation bodies cooperation in criminal proceedings 
by providing scientifically reasonable propositions about 
improvement of the legislation and law-enforcement practice. 
Statement of the main material. Acceptance of the new 
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine on April 13, 2012 was a 
result of long-term discussions and searches of optimum model 
of a criminal proceeding which corresponds to international legal 
standards of human rights protection in this sphere. Its provisions 
were based on ideas of the Concept of reforming of criminal 
justice in Ukraine from April 8, 2008 which provided that pre-
judicial investigation should be carried out without excessive 
formalization and duplication of functions. The prosecutor 
should estimate and direct a course of investigation [14]. In this 
context legislator provided that the procedural management 
of investigation will be carried out by the prosecutor who is 
allocated with the right to give instructions to investigators and 
will accept or coordinate key procedural decisions (the message 
to the person about suspicion, the address with the petition to 
the investigatory judge, drawing up of the indictment, etc.) [13]. 
The abovementioned concept was fixed in p. 2 Art. 36 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine which formalized 
wide reference of the prosecutor on laws enforcement in the 
form of the procedural management during carrying out pre-
judicial investigation. The term "procedural management" 
is not defined in the law. On the basis of theoretical works 
[12, c. 19] and subject matter of the abovementioned article, 
it is possible to make a conclusion that it is understood as 
imperious and administrative influence of the prosecutor on 
bodies of inquiry and preliminary investigation for the purpose 
of the direction and coordination of pre-judicial investigation 
process. In our opinion, this term is imperfect for specifying the 
prosecutor's function in pre-judicial investigation. At the same 
time, it correctly designates nature of cooperation between 
the prosecutor and preliminary investigation bodies. Thus the 
prosecutor acts as a superior body in relation to preliminary 
investigation bodies. 
As objects of the procedural management act preliminary 
investigation bodies which are investigatory divisions of 
law-enforcement bodies, security services of Ukraine, the 
body which is carrying out control on observance of the tax 
legislation, the State bureau of investigations, and also divisions 
of detectives and division of internal control of National anti-
corruption bureau of Ukraine are, their officials - investigators, 
and also heads of preliminary investigation bodies. Also the 
prosecutor carries out the procedural management upon 
operative divisions of law-enforcement bodies, security 
service, National anti-corruption bureau of Ukraine, the State 
bureau of investigations, the bodies, carrying out control of 
observance of the tax and customs legislation, bodies of the 
Public penitentiary service of Ukraine, bodies of the Public 
border service of Ukraine. It occurs during carrying out of 
investigatory (search) public and private actions in criminal 
proceedings by the abovementioned bodies. 
The abovementioned objects of the procedural management 
can be divided into the main and facultative. The main 
IUNIE 2016 189 
JURNALUL JURIDIC NATIONAL: TEORIE SI PRACTICA • НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА • NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL: TEORY AND PRACTICE 
objects are preliminary investigation bodies and facultative 
are operative divisions because they carry out investigatory 
(search) public and private actions in criminal proceedings 
not according to «the general rule», but only on the basis 
of a written order of the investigator, the prosecutor. Thus, 
operative divisions play a supporting role in the mechanism 
of pre-judicial investigation, although they perform the main 
work on finding of crimes traces and persons who committed 
them. 
If earlier the prosecutor acted as an impartial guarantor of 
the rule of law compliance and human rights protection in the 
sphere of criminal proceedings [2, c. 185], according to the 
new model he is an active participant of criminal trial. Activity 
of the prosecutor is a mover of criminal proceedings which 
directs them. As both the prosecutor and the investigator are the 
charge party according to the law, the goal of their activity in 
criminal proceedings is formation, promotion and asserting of 
a statement about commission the act, which provides criminal 
liability under the law, by a certain person. On the basis thereof, 
prosecutor's supervision on legal order in the investigator's 
activity is carried out not for abstract "respecting the rule 
of law" Its aim is to supervise that the investigator without 
breaking the law accused the guilty person of commission the 
crime. Violation of law by the investigator during formation of 
evidential base involves prosecutor's impossibility to prosecute 
an indictment in court [10, c. 69]. For this reason, the prosecutor 
is interested in lawful acting of the investigator, as well as in 
justness of all his procedural decisions. Only while meeting 
this condition the prosecutor's evidential base for pressing the 
charge in court would be due, eligible and full. 
Thus the investigator is procedurally subordinated to the 
prosecutor as to the procedural head of pre-judicial investigation. 
Level of his procedural independence is considerably narrowed. 
On the one hand, p. 5 Art. 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
of Ukraine forbids intervention in investigator's activity of the 
persons, who do not have statutory powers for it. It is understood 
as "external" procedural independence of the investigator: from 
extraneous persons as well as other participants of process - the 
suspected of committing a crime, the defender, the victim and 
others. At the same time, the investigator is not procedurally 
independent in relation to the prosecutor. The prosecutor has 
not only the right, but also a duty to intervene into procedural 
activity of the investigator in the cases as provided for in 
the law. Moreover, the majority of prosecutors consider the 
investigator as the technical figure whose activity is aimed at 
collecting and registration of evidences under the prosecutor's 
control. The prosecutor points the general direction and judicial 
prospect of pre-judicial investigation. Thus, the prosecutor is 
responsible for result of pre-judicial investigation. It is possible 
to present this model like this: "the prosecutor thinks, and the 
investigator works". 
In many respects such changes are caused by the fact that 
the prosecutor is really empowered with essential leverage 
over the investigator, namely: the right to give the investigator 
instructions and assignments obligatory for execution; right to 
abrogate illegal or unreasonable decisions of the investigator. 
Besides, there is a need of receiving by the investigator the 
prosecutor's approval on certain procedural actions, etc. In 
other words, the prosecutor influences the investigator towards: 
supervising his actions; directing these actions; coordinating 
investigator' decisions. 
Thus powers of the prosecutor are partially duplicated 
with powers of the head of preliminary investigation body. In 
practice it leads to the conflict between the prosecutor and the 
head of preliminary investigation body. Thus the prosecutor has 
more procedural powers, the head of preliminary investigation 
body is closer to the investigator, being his direct head. Such 
"dualism" of the management is undesirable and should be 
legislatively settled in favor of one of these subjects. In our 
opinion, the priority should be given to the prosecutor and 
so his powers should be expanded and powers of the head of 
preliminary investigation body narrowed. 
The difference between their powers is that the prosecutor 
carries out the procedural management of pre-judicial 
investigation, and the head of preliminary investigation body 
organizes pre-judicial investigation. The head of preliminary 
investigation body is given special powers which the prosecutor 
earlier possessed: to discharge the investigator of carrying out 
pre-judicial investigation through the motivated resolution, and 
also to carry out pre-judicial investigation, using thus powers 
of the investigator. As well as the prosecutor, the head of 
preliminary investigation body has the right to study materials 
of pre-judicial investigation and to give written instructions to 
the investigator. However, these instructions cannot contradict 
with decisions and instructions of the prosecutor. In his turn, 
the prosecutor can give his written instructions directly to the 
head of preliminary investigation body. Thus, the prosecutor 
is procedurally higher in relation to the head of preliminary 
investigation body. 
V.M. Yurchishin argues that the head of preliminary 
investigation body is deprived of powers on procedural response 
to the violations of law by his subordinate investigators, 
revealed by him. So he has no right to abrogate the decisions 
of investigators on his sole discretion. In case of detection 
of the illegal or unreasonable decision of the investigator, 
the head of preliminary investigation body is obliged to 
address to the prosecutor a request for its abrogation [16, c. 
210]. In our opinion, this statement is only partially correct. 
According to clause 4 p. 2 Art. 39 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code of Ukraine, the head of preliminary investigation body 
should take measures to eliminate violations of law in case 
of their commission by the investigator. The law does not 
concretize in which way the head of preliminary investigation 
body should take such measures. It is possible to assume that 
besides organizational levers on the investigator (for example, 
by attraction him to disciplinary responsibility), the head of 
preliminary investigation body can also abrogate his illegal 
decisions by way of departmental control. Thus, this question 
should be concretized in the legislation. 
In case of detection of illegal or unreasonable decisions of 
the investigator the prosecutor has the right to abrogate them. 
As the majority of procedural decisions of the investigator are 
made out in the form of resolutions, the prosecutor reacts by 
the way of issuing a decree on abrogation of the investigator's 
resolution. Most often prosecutors abrogate illegal resolutions 
of investigators on the termination of criminal proceedings. So, 
during the year 2015 prosecutors took out 37 918 resolutions 
on abrogation of resolutions on the termination of criminal 
proceedings [8]. After pronouncement of such a prosecutor's 
resolution the pre-judicial investigation renews. 
At carrying out by the prosecutor of the procedural 
management of pre-judicial investigation one of the most 
effective powers is the right of the prosecutor to instruct the 
investigator and preliminary investigation body to perform in 
the set term investigatory (search) public and private actions, 
other procedural actions or to instruct concerning their carrying 
out (point 4 p. 2 Art. 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 
Ukraine). Thus the comparative analysis shows that in the 
conditions of action of the new Criminal Procedure Code of 
Ukraine activity of the prosecutor considerably increased 
in this direction. So, according to statistical data of the 
Prosecutor's General Office of Ukraine in 2011 by prosecutors 
were given 92 110, for 2012 - 103 306, for 2013 - 234 420, for 
2014- 196 509, for 2015 - 174 450 written instructions [3-8]. 
Thus, during implementation of the procedural management 
prosecutors give investigators instructions approximately 2 
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times more often than at implementation of supervision of pre-
judicial investigation. However, in these latter days' activity of 
prosecutors in a giving directions to investigators decreased a 
little. It is connected with both reduction of quantity of criminal 
proceedings, as well as with reduction of number of prosecutors, 
which occurred recently. Besides, indirectly such a tendency 
shows improvement of investigators' overall effectiveness and 
their independence in carrying out investigation. That is, the 
less violations in the work of the investigator occur, the less 
grounds are for prosecutors to give them instructions and so 
investigators become more independent. 
The law does not establish the list of procedural actions 
on which prosecutors can instruct, so the scope of the 
aforementioned power of the prosecutor is practically not 
limited. An exception is the fact that issues, which instructions 
and an assignments concern, cannot fall outside the limits of 
the criminal procedural law and also procedural competence of 
the body or the person to whom they are given [ 11, с. 117]. That 
is, the prosecutor cannot give the investigator an instruction 
on the criminal proceeding which the investigator does not 
investigate. The prosecutor cannot also give the instruction 
on carrying out procedural action which can be carried out 
only on permission of the investigating judge. Also direction 
of illegitimate instructions to the investigator is not allowed 
(for example, on use of force to a suspect). If the prosecutor 
fell outside the limits of powers, it leads to his responsibility 
provided by the law. The most severe responsibility in this 
sphere is criminal liability of the prosecutor (for example, on 
the basis of article 365 Criminal code of Ukraine "Excess of the 
power or office powers"). 
The law demands registration of instructions of the 
prosecutor in writing, but it does not exclude providing oral 
instructions and instructions which are rather widespread on 
practice. However it is necessary to consider that absence of 
written form complicates implementation of the subsequent 
control of the prosecutor behind implementation of such 
instructions. Also there is a threat of the wrong perception of 
oral instructions by persons to whom they are given. Therefore, 
at departmental level accurate requirements to these documents 
should be fixed. 
It is necessary to emphasize, that according to p. 3 Art. 39, 
p. 4 Art. 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and Art. 
25 of the Law of Ukraine "On prosecutor's office" preliminary 
investigation bodies are obliged to follow written instructions 
of the prosecutor. Nonfulfillment by these persons of lawful 
instructions of the prosecutor, which have been taken out in 
an order, the provided Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, 
involves responsibility provided by the law. First of all, it is 
disciplinary responsibility under the relevant disciplinary 
statutes of preliminary investigation bodies. Administrative 
responsibility is also provided. So, according to Art. 185-8 of 
the Code of Ukraine on administrative offenses, responsibility 
for nonfulfillment of legal requirements of the prosecutor 
in the form of is a fine from 20 to 40 tax-free minima of 
the income of citizens. In 2012-2014 criminal liability for 
deliberate systematic nonfulfillment of lawful instructions 
of the prosecutor by the investigator at implementation of 
criminal proceedings was provided (Art. 381-1 of the Criminal 
code of Ukraine). But now the given norm is excluded from the 
legislation and investigators are not subjects to criminal liability 
for nonfulfillment of prosecutor's instructions anymore. 
There are certain problems in prosecutors' response to illegal 
actions of investigators, including the facts of nonfulfillment by 
them instructions of prosecutors. It is connected with the fact 
that current Law of Ukraine "On prosecutor's office" does not 
provide acts of reaction of the prosecutor on such violations. 
For example, in the Law "On prosecutor's office" of the year 
1991 such acts were provided: resolution, representation. In the 
new Law "On prosecutor's office" such acts are not mentioned 
at all [9, c. 213]. In case of discovery by the prosecutor in 
actions of the investigator features of the administrative offence 
provided by Art. 185-8 the Code of Ukraine on administrative 
offenses "Nonfulfillment of legal requirements of the 
prosecutor", the prosecutor is authorized to make the protocol 
on an administrative offense (item 11 of Art. 255 the Code of 
Ukraine on administrative offenses). In the conditions of force 
of the norm considering criminal liability of the investigator for 
nonfulfillment of prosecutor's instructions, prosecutor reacted 
to it by initiation of pre-judicial investigation. 
However, the question of initiation by the prosecutor 
bringing the investigator to a disciplinary responsibility 
legislatively is not solved. In practice in case of discovery by 
the prosecutor the violation the functions by the investigator, 
prosecutors address to the head of the investigator, to bring 
them to a disciplinary responsibility, with the corresponding 
instruction, representation or the letter. In them the violations 
of the investigator are mentioned, and the attention to the 
question of initiation of disciplinary production concerning the 
investigator is brought. However, in certain cases to prosecutors 
receive refuse on consideration of such documents as their form 
legislatively is not defined. Therefore, the abovementioned gap 
in the legislation should be corrected. 
According to statistical data, for the year 2015 prosecutors 
introduced 5 751 acts of reaction concerning the staff of law-
enforcement bodies, 153 - concerning the staff of the Public 
fiscal service and 33 - concerning the staff of Security service 
of Ukraine. 7 883 employees of law-enforcement bodies, 269 
staff of the Public fiscal service and 54 employees of Security 
service of Ukraine are brought to a disciplinary responsibility 
on the basis of documents of the prosecutor. 364 employees 
of law-enforcement bodies and 48 staff of the Public fiscal 
service received notices of suspicion in commission of criminal 
offenses [8]. Thus, prosecutors actively react on committed 
violations of the law by the staff of preliminary investigation 
bodies, even despite problems in legislative regulation which 
were mentioned above. 
Existence of responsibility of the investigator for 
nonfulfillment of instructions of the prosecutor is proved by 
important procedural value of such instructions and need of their 
exact and unconditional execution by investigators. Thus, it is 
completely justifiable. However, the majority of investigators 
consider so severe sanctions as means of pressure or coercion 
from the prosecutor. This situation is also aggravated with the 
fact, that the law does not demand validity or motivation of 
instructions of the prosecutor. Thereof considerable part of 
them is formal, inconcrete, leaning on estimated concepts. 
Such concepts of understanding of the investigator and the 
prosecutor can be interpreted differently (for example, "to 
take effective measures", "to increase quality of pre-judicial 
investigation", "not to be limited to these instructions" etc). 
Some instructions of the prosecutor may be inexecutable at all 
or in the limited terms set by the prosecutor (for example, the 
prosecutor instructs to interrogate several witnesses living in the 
different cities in 3-day term). The negative tendency arising in 
practical activities in this regard, is the formalistic approach of 
prosecutors to making directions (which sometimes reach the 
point where investigators write themselves instructions instead 
of the prosecutor, who is inactive). Or abuse by prosecutors 
of such a right which can essentially complicate work of the 
investigator (when prosecutors give petty instructions on minor, 
little significant questions and demand their performance in a 
short time, distracting the investigator from real investigation 
of a crime). 
The law provides guarantees from such negative situations. 
For example, the right of the investigator to appeal against any 
decisions, actions or divergence of the prosecutor, accepted or 
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made in the corresponding pre-judicial production (Art. 311 
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine). Such complaint 
should be fixed in writing in prosecutor's office of the highest 
level concerning prosecutor's office in which the prosecutor 
holds a position, the decision, action or which divergence 
will be appealed. Complaints are considered in three days 
and by results of their consideration the following decisions 
can be made: 1) to uphold the decision, to recognize actions 
or a divergence as lawful; 2) to change the decision in a part; 
3) to abrogate the decision and to make the new decision, to 
recognize actions or a divergence as illegal and to oblige to 
make new action (the Art. of Art. 312-313 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code of Ukraine). 
It is necessary to consider that the investigator's appeal 
of the decisions, actions or divergences of the prosecutor is 
the abnormal situation that shows an existence of the conflict 
between them. Modeling a legal construction of this conflict 
permission, the Ukrainian legislator took a side of the prosecutor 
as, firstly, the appeal by the investigator of decisions, actions or 
a divergence of the prosecutor does not stop their execution (p. 
3 Art. 312 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine). Thus, 
the investigator is obliged to execute such an instruction given 
to him even if is not agree with it and tries to appeal against 
it. Secondly, the right to resolve the conflict is provided to 
the official of prosecutor's office of the highest level, whose 
decision is final and is not a subject to the appeal in court (p. 
4 Art. 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine). It is 
obvious that in this case on the party of the prosecutor, whose 
actions will be appealed, also corporate solidarity acts. 
If the decision, actions or a divergence of the prosecutor 
are recognized illegal, such prosecutor may be replaced with 
another from among officials of bodies of prosecutor's office 
of that level (p. 3 Art. 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
of Ukraine). However, it is the right, instead of a duty of the 
official of prosecutor's office of the highest level, and in practice 
meets extremely seldom. Cases of abrogation of decisions of 
the prosecutor by the prosecutor of the highest level are also 
exclusively rare. 
Other option of investigator's influence on a procedural 
position of the prosecutor is the address to the head of 
preliminary investigation body. Differently from the appeal of 
actions of the prosecutor, such option is special. It is allowedonly 
in cases of refusal of the prosecutor to coordinate the petition 
of the investigator to the investigatory judge about application 
of measures on providing criminal proceedings, carrying 
out investigatory (search) actions or private investigatory 
(search) actions. In such cases the investigator has the right 
to address to the head of preliminary investigation body who 
after studying the petition if necessary initiates consideration 
of the questions stated in it before the prosecutor of the highest 
level. Such prosecutor in a term of three days coordinates the 
corresponding petition or refuses its coordination (p. 3 Art. 40 
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine). 
Thus, the abovementioned order is applied only in cases of 
refusal of the prosecutor in coordination of the petition submitted 
by the investigator. However, it does not consider cases when the 
prosecutor does not accept any actions according to the petition 
declared by the investigator. In such cases the divergence of the 
prosecutor takes place, however it, according to the law, is not the 
ground for investigator's addressing to the head of preliminary 
investigation body. However, the divergence of prosecutors 
which appears in temporizing with consideration of the petition, 
is most widespread on practice. For example, concerning 
choosing to the suspect a measure of restraint when delay with 
the solution of this question can lead to that the suspect will 
disappear from preliminary investigation body. 
The solution of this problem, in our opinion, is the 
following. Firstly, it is necessary to establish accurate terms for 
coordination by the prosecutor of petitions of the investigator. 
For today, concerning terms of criminal proceedings such 
terms are not defined. If the prosecutor did not coordinate the 
petition in the term established by the law, it is considered to be 
refused. Secondly, the investigator shall also have the right to 
address to the head of preliminary investigation body in case of 
divergence of the prosecutor. 
In case the abovementioned problems occurred, 
investigators, as a rule, do not exercise the right to appeal 
the decisions or actions (divergence) of the prosecutor, or 
to address to the head of preliminary investigation body. 
However, it does not proof absence of conflicts between them. 
So, the force the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine of the 
year 1960, 37,6% of investigators had divergences with the 
prosecutor, in favor of the prosecutor were solved - 68,9% of 
them, in favor of the investigator - 31,1%. Thus it is noted, that 
in some cases, receding before authority of the prosecutor and 
his powers, investigators do not decide to direct the objections 
to the higher prosecutors. As a result, serious harm to 
investigation is done. To witness objections of the investigator 
on instructions of the prosecutor is almost impossible. The 
reasons are totally different (for example, authority of the 
prosecutor, unwillingness of deterioration of business relations 
with the prosecutor, the decision through the prosecutor of 
various household questions etc). As a result, researchers 
come to a conclusion that the mechanism of regulation of 
controversial questions' regulation between the investigator 
and the prosecutor does not always work. One of the reasons 
of this is inadequate ensuring of procedural independence of 
the investigator [15, c. 101-102]. However, it is impossible to 
agree with the previous conclusion, because, as it was specified 
before, discussion does not go about procedural independence 
of the investigator in relation to the prosecutor. 
In the conditions of the new Criminal Procedure Code of 
Ukraine, where public prosecutor's supervision in the form 
of the procedural management on pre-judicial investigation 
gained systematic and even total character, and possibilities 
of influence on the prosecutor by investigators considerably 
increased, this mechanism still gives big failures. So, by results 
of the rerquisition of 120 investigators of law-enforcement 
bodies and Security service of Ukraine, more than 70% faced 
unreasonable or illegal actions, more often - a divergence 
of prosecutors. At the same time, nobody of them appealed 
against such actions or decisions, and only 10% of respondents 
allow such possibility at all. As the result, negative attitude 
of investigators to prosecutors is observed. In their opinion, 
prosecutors carry out supervision inefficiently and this is one 
of the factors which generates legal nihilism of investigators 
and leads to procedural mistakes and violations [1, c. 21]. 
Preconditions for formation of such an opinion are obvious: 
the investigator bears responsibility for results of pre-judicial 
investigation, but these results depend on him only partially. A 
number of key procedural decisions are accepted only by the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor should direct the investigator, but 
in most cases he does this formally, without penetrating into 
the main point and without rendering the investigator necessary 
help. The investigator cannot influence the prosecutor. At the 
same time, responsibility for results of pre-judicial investigation 
is assigned completely on the investigator. 
Such model is half and half, inefficient. Therefore, 
it is necessary to bring an attention to the question of 
expediency of giving the right to the appeal of actions 
and decisions of the prosecutor to the investigator which 
in practice remains unrealized. The prosecutor as the 
procedural head, directs a course and defines prospects of 
pre-judicial investigation. Therefore, the investigator has 
no right to estimate his instructions, furthermore to react to 
divergence of the prosecutor in criminal proceedings. But 
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thus it is the prosecutor, instead of the investigator, who 
should bear responsibility for completeness, timeliness and 
legality of pre-judicial investigation and its results. Thus, 
the need of investigator's appeal of actions or decisions 
of the prosecutor disappears, except cases when they are 
obviously illegal. 
Such an approach leads to forming of the model "public 
prosecutor's inquiry", when the investigator is considered 
as an auxiliary figure behind the prosecutor. Thus the tasks 
of investigator become simpler and are shorten to collecting 
and appropriate registration of proofs whereas their legal 
assessment is given by the prosecutor. The initiative of the 
investigator is limited to carrying out necessary investigatory 
actions, and key procedural decisions in criminal proceedings 
are accepted by the prosecutor. So, the responsibility for results 
of pre-judicial investigation should lay down completely on the 
prosecutor. The investigator is responsible for them only within 
his competence and also in the volume of the instructions, 
provided by the prosecutor. Such model will certainly eliminate 
existing contradictions between investigators and prosecutors 
and will give the chance to increase efficiency of pre-judicial 
investigation. 
Conclusions. As a result, it should be noted, that the 
majority of problems in the sphere of interaction of the 
prosecutor and preliminary investigation bodies in Ukrainian 
criminal proceedings results not only from shortcomings of the 
new Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, but from insufficient 
experience of its practical application. Slow shifts in sense of 
justice of investigators and prosecutors are also a problem. 
In some cases, they continue to be guided by the conceptual 
ideas of the former legislation which have lost urgency. These 
problems can be resolved without intervention of the legislator, 
but by accumulation of law-enforcement practice and positive 
experience. 
At the same time, the main problem of cooperation between 
prosecutors' and preliminary investigation bodies' in criminal 
proceedings is considered to be half and half nature of pre-
judicial investigation reform. Prosecutors received expanded 
powers, however all the responsibility for the results of pre-
judicial investigation is not put on them. Formally, investigators 
are considered independent and bear responsibility for quality 
of investigation, but actually they obey to prosecutors and heads 
of preliminary investigation bodies. So, further improvement 
of the legislation and law-enforcement practice in this sphere 
should move in the direction of expansion of both powers 
and responsibility of prosecutors in preliminary investigation 
system. 
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